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cloaks their work. Still, his book represents an invaluable contribution through 
surveillance of the past to promoting alertness for the present and future. 
Steve Hewitt 
University of Birmingham, UK 
Paul Rutherford, Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War Against 
Iraq (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004). 
Although it is now commonplace to observe the way in which politics is 
increasingly reliant on marketing strategies to deliver its message, rarely is 
such an observation so rigorously and compellingly pursued as it is in Paul 
Rutherford's Weapons of Mass Persuasion. Rutherford provides a bracing 
account of the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq and details how the Bush 
administration packaged and sold the war with great success to the American 
public. Bush's address to the nation in March 2003, just days before the actual 
invasion began, was less a report to the citizenry on matters crucial to the 
nation than the culmination of the elaborate promotional campaign designed 
specifically to transform the idea of war against Iraq into a desirable product. 
By the time the bombs starting falling on Baghdad, enthusiasm for the war 
had reached a fevered pitch among certain sectors of the American public, and 
all that was left for the Bush administration to do was to deliver this product to 
eager consumers. The news media served as the ideal distribution mechanism 
for this. Whatever the opportunities the Intemet provided to assemble a dis- 
senting or dissonant account of the events in Iraq, television retained its privi- 
leged place as the primary source for information about the war. Rutherford is 
at his most incisive and illuminating in detailing the experience of "real-time 
war" as broadcast on the trinity of twenty-four-hour news channels that control 
the American market: CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC. But such a "real-time 
war" could not have occurred without the Pentagon serving as its CO-producer, 
not simply in terms of actually waging the war that served as the raw material 
for television reports, but by investing in all manner of media technology to 
ensure that it would be the primary content provider for the media's coverage. 
The quirks of advanced technology came to define a Pentagon house-style. 
Ranging from the greenish hue of the footage gleaned from night cams 
attached to soldiers' helmets to the perpetually disintegrating pixellated images 
bounced from desert to satellite to newsroom, these stylistic tics served to 
authenticate the reports filtered, processed, and often completely assembled by 
the Pentagon that the news channels fi-equently conveyed without question or 
commentary. 
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Rutherford evades the temptation to portray the working relationship 
between the news media and the Pentagon in terms of overt conspiracy or cal- 
culated collusion. Instead, he suggests that the military and the media are 
"locked into a symbiotic relationship" that is more a result of converging inter- 
ests than deliberate scheming (77). Such an interpretation does not deny that 
the Pentagon attempted at every level to manage how the war was represented 
in the media, but rather points to how willing the media were to comply with 
the accounts of the war offered by the Bush administration. The media's acqui- 
escence reveals how invested (libidinally as well as financially) they were in 
providing the product which they played a crucial part in promoting. Such 
compliance ultimately veered toward complicity. Rutherford provides the best 
example of this when he analyzes how rapidly the media embraced the vocab- 
ulary manufactured by the Pentagon for the war. The incessant repetition of 
phrases such as "shock and awe" and "decapitation strike" (voiced by anchors 
with no small measure of erotic charge) was the surest sign that the media had 
relinquished any effort to report on the war directly, and instead had chosen to 
serve as a mere conduit for the military's fabrications. Likewise, the embedded 
journalist became a symbol of the symbiotic relationship between the media 
and the military. After what the Pentagon had viewed as the renegade and rogue 
reporting of Vietnam, and also to a lesser extent of the first Gulf War, the prac- 
tice of embedding journalists was devised as a way to return to the Ernie 
PylelWWII tradition of war reporting. The major media outlets brushed aside 
accusations of compromise or partiality primarily because they craved access 
to the images that only the Pentagon could provide. As a consequence, the 
embedded journalist functioned less as a reporter of ongoing events than as a 
proxy for the viewer at home, bound and constrained by the homosocial cama- 
raderie of the unit. 
However striking the images that emerged from Iraq, Rutherford is alert to 
the central role that narrative played in the ongoing management of the war. 
Emblematic in this regard is the story of Private Jessica Lynch, whose rescue 
from capture by a special-forces term, Rutherford notes, "was made to order 
for the propaganda machine" (68). The Pentagon carefully drew on an exten- 
sive set of fictional precedents, from the imperial adventure story to Hollywood 
action film, to craft the story, but ultimately the tale was a victim of its own 
success. The media were so excited to have a story that was the stuff of 
Hollywood that exaggerating it proved too much a temptation. Even when 
reporters from the BBC and the Toronto Star discovered that the actual rescue 
bore little resemblance to the Saving Private Ryan-type escapade into which 
the American media had transformed it, many outlets stuck doggedly to the 
fantasy they had concocted while most others tried to salvage it to some degree. 
Rutherford makes reference throughout to the domain of popular culture, 
and rightly notes that America's understanding of the rest of the world is fil- 
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tered through narrative archetypes and situations primarily derived from 
Hollywood. His appeals to cinematic examples are never as abrasive or explo- 
sive as, say, Slavoj Zizek's are in Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle (2004), but they 
nevertheless do provide a catalogue of America's fantasies about its adventures 
in the world. Rutherford's text, however, stops short of discussing how the col- 
lective fantasies articulated through conventional narratives can operate at an 
unconscious as well as conscious level. Such a consideration would further an 
understanding of how the media can insist on their independence and objectiv- 
ity even in the face of obvious capitulations and compromises. That those at the 
Pentagon are to a certain degree conscious of the narrative conventions upon 
which they draw is indisputable, but the extent to which the news media dis- 
avows its reliance on narrative formulas gleaned from the crassest of 
Hollywood spectacles is a good deal more disturbing. 
Rutherford's dissection of the symbiotic relationship between the media 
and the military in the United States is complemented by his analysis of how 
the comrnodty they produce and distribute is consumed elsewhere. He assem- 
bles a citizens' panel of twenty in order to assess the impact that the ubiquitous 
media coverage of the war had on those who stand just outside the target mar- 
ket. Talking to Canadians, Rutherford discovers that they looked with varying 
degrees of scepticism on the Bush administration's claims and imperatives and 
reacted with varying degrees of aversion to the patriotic enthusiasms that were 
offered by the major news networks. Whatever reservations one may have 
about Rutherford's hastily assembled panel - the comment that he drew his 
panellists from among "the articulate public" seems particularly unfortunate as 
it appears to consign those beyond the academy and professional classes to 
inarticulacy - it does afford a chance to think about structuring fantasies of 
Canadian identity as well. Nearly all of Rutherford's panellists reported a dis- 
gust or disdain with the coverage the US media offered, but many admitted that 
CNN became a guilty pleasure in times of war. The embarrassed disavowal of 
this pleasure points to a more ambivalent relation to the US media than 
Rutherford suggests here. Canadians may not be the precise demographic tar- 
geted by either the Bush administration or the major American networks, but 
they do stand close enough to suffer collateral damage. The weapons of mass 
persuasion may not have struck a direct hit on Rutherford's panellists, but their 
comments do suggest that they were shaken by them. 
Andrew Burke 
University of Winnipeg 
